

**Maintaining an international order of peace
under conditions of growing natural resource scarcity
and global climate change¹**

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Abstract

This paper assesses international policy responses to the security implications of deteriorating ecological conditions worldwide, as they have come to be articulated through a number of key policy statements in recent years. The analysis points to the presence of a burgeoning war mentality especially amongst larger political players who feel vital resource reserves are at serious risk (e.g. Russia's claims that its resource-rich territories in the Arctic are under threat of foreign invasion). Most likely threats to international security are thought to stem from situations where the physical impacts of climate change overwhelm governments' capacities to manage an equitable distribution of resources and maintain civil relations amongst their populations. When this occurs, political instability and inter-communal violence are said to be highly probable. This paper considers whether or not the perceived 'inevitability' of war in the future is reasonable, or even a fair response to growing natural resource scarcity when humanity's long-term survival is at stake. The need for new standards of global cooperation to sustain 'our common future' has been made abundantly clear by more recent assessments of the rate of global warming and rising sea levels. Yet in spite of this acknowledgement, both the level of international competition for resources and the threat of military action continue to intensify. The latter part of this paper considers prospects for introducing alternative measures that might pre-empt the emergence of situations of war and re-establish peaceful relations through a democratic decision-making on issues relating to the management of global reserves of oil, minerals, water, etc. An argument in favour of the establishment of new 'transnational peace constituencies' will be made, where resource entitlements, scenarios of conflict, and regulative principles ideally are subject to rigorous re-

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vision on the basis of a more socially engaged and peace-centred response to rapidly changing resource conditions worldwide. To sustain the future of a flourishing humanity, a major shift in understandings of morally relevant community is required and more emphasis, arguably, needs to be placed upon humanity's co-membership of overlapping communities of ecological fate and human rights solidarity.

Key words: climate change, war, resource scarcity, peace-enhancement, transnational deliberation, cosmopolitanism.

1. Introduction

According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2009), at least eighteen of the most violent conflicts in the last two decades have been fuelled by natural resource distribution. Not only are these disputes centred on 'high value' resources, e.g. diamonds, gas, or oil, but increasingly basic, life-sustaining resources, e.g. fresh water or arable lands. In a *Report* to the European Council on Climate Change and International Security (March 2008), the European Commission notes the gravity of these developments and urges Council to establish a 'preventative security policy' capable of responding effectively to the threats greater natural resource conflict will pose in the future. 'Entire regions', it argues, may be destabilised by a 'politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it' (European Commission 2008: 5). Threats to international security are most likely to emerge where governance capacity at the state level is overstretched and unable to manage the physical impacts of climate change. Where this occurs, civil unrest, inter-communal violence, mass migration, and political instability become increasingly probable. In its *Climate Change Adaptation Report* (2010: 3), the US Department of Homeland Security echoed many of the concerns of the European Commission when it explained how as a 'threat multiplier', climate change may trigger 'organised insurrections due to increased resource scarcity, weakening states, and widening economic inequalities' conditions that in severe cases are likely to 'breed extremism and terrorism'.

A future of conflict appears to be presented through this meta-discourse on climate change effects as the most likely fate of the resource challenged communities of tomorrow. Unlike the past, however, intense competition and disputes regarding claims to ownership of depleting resources proceed on the basis of a shared understanding that reserves of such precious resources are diminishing worldwide. In these circumstances, states become more proactive in protecting the natural resource base under their control, especially if the economic, political, and social rights of its peoples to self-determination are to continue to be exercised in a manner that is meaningful (Buchanan 2003: 233). Indeed, the right of each state to defend its own natural resource supply is strongly reaffirmed in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) where it states that each sovereign state has a right 'to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies' (see UNFCCC 1992:1). However, given that states not only exploit their own resources but many also actively pursue the exploitation of resources abroad to enhance the natural resource and economic advantages of their own citizens (e.g., in more recent years, over 50,000,000 hectares of arable land have been bought or leased by EU, US, South Korean and Saudi Arabian owned enterprises in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, the Congo, and beyond, to grow food and bio-fuel crops, see Vidal 2010), interpretations of this right require further consideration now.

Even a brief overview of international discourse on the security ramifications of ongoing climate destruction gives the reader a sense of a burgeoning war mentality, one that carries with it a number of political ideological assumptions about the 'law of peoples' (Rawls 1999) and the body of rules that nations generally recognise as binding in their conduct with each other. Equality, as the basic principle of liberal democratic regimes, is interpreted as the equal right of all sovereign communities not only to self-determine life and liberty, but also the right to self-defence against attack. Following on from sovereign communities' right to self-defence is a whole other set of principles on 'just war', that is, the conditions under which war between states can be deemed just. As Michael Walzer (1977: 57) explains, states are understood to embody the 'common life' of their people and it is because of the sacredness of this shared life that a 'presumptive' moral as much as legal value is assigned to their de-

fence. Acts of aggression against a particular state are, therefore, thought to represent a violation not only of its borders, but also the common life and liberty of its peoples. It is on the basis of this reasoning that Michael Walzer (1977: 61-62; see also Rawls 1999) maintains the legitimate right of each sovereign state to affirm: (1) its right to its own territory and the resources located therein; (2) its right to denounce an act of aggression by an external party; (3) its right to justify war as an 'appropriate' response to attack and; (4) its right to wage war in self-defence.

Implicit in recent reports on the threat of greater climate-induced resource conflict, including those surveyed briefly above, is the notion that war, in certain situations, is 'just' and given the inevitability of resource shortages amongst many states in the future, highly likely. The fact that this war mentality is coupled with intensifying resource rivalry, greater military presence, and more invasive exploitative practices in some of the most vulnerable ecosystems in the world (e.g. large scale gas and oil extraction, deep seabed drilling and exploitation of minerals in the Arctic) means that this mentality must be the subject to greater critical democratic consideration. For many, including movement actors, e.g. Greenpeace International and their sympathisers, military responses to deteriorating ecological conditions worldwide is neither a reasonable nor a fair response to what is still a situation of 'runaway climate change' (carbon emissions levels are still dangerously high, Naidoo 2013) when the long-term survival of growing numbers is at stake. In the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan, which displaced more than 4,000,000 people, the Philippines climate commissioner told international delegates at UN climate talks in Warsaw in November 2013 how he and many of his fellow Filipinos 'rally behind the climate advocates who peacefully confront those historically responsible for the current state of our climate' (see Naidoo 2013), including the thirty Greenpeace activists arrested at gunpoint by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in the waters of the Arctic for their protest against oil drilling in the region and jailed for two months on charges of 'hooliganism'.

2. Resource justice, moral argument, and competing rights claims

2.1. Resource justice for whom?

If it can be proven that certain actors deplete the resource pool of the global commons at unsustainable rates (including the Earth's atmosphere) and in that, jeopardise the collective reserves of resources necessary to secure the future survival of *all* of humanity, then such actors may not possess truly legitimate moral grounds for waging war against resource-deprived others. Neither may they possess legitimate grounds for claiming a disproportionate share of existing reserves of rapidly diminishing resources, including gas, oil, fish, and mineral deposits in regions as the Arctic². The rapid melting of ice cover in the Arctic has allowed for a greater level of exploration and drilling for previously inaccessible resources. UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Achim Steiner notes how 'the rush to exploit these vast untapped reserves have consequences that must be carefully thought through by countries everywhere, given the global impacts and issues at stake' (Queally 2013). One major 'impact' is the detrimental effect the race for resources in the Arctic will have on local populations.

Considering how the rights of the peoples of a particular state are grounded in their common life and liberty, a question arises what rights the indigenous peoples of the Arctic have to protect their reserves of precious resources from foreign aggressors. Aggressors, according to dominant interpretations of the law of peoples, include all those who do not possess a legitimate claim to the territories of the Arctic, those who defend their claims on the resources of this region and legitimise intense military action on the basis of their own national interests, not those of the peoples of the Arctic on whose territory these states now pursue new sources of minerals, gas, and oil. According to political theorists, e.g. Allen Buchanan (2003), territorial rights offer the strongest legal and moral foundations upon which states can base their claims to resource-rich regions. However, in the case of the Arctic, many of those

² According to the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and 30% of undiscovered gas supplies.

who currently lay claim to its precious resource reserves do not enjoy such territorial privileges. As a consequence, China, South Korea, and Great Britain lobby to have the Arctic redefined legally and politically as a 'zone of common possession' – the notion that the jurisdiction of the political community that lays claim to the resources of the Arctic should not necessarily be aligned exclusively with its territories³. Yet this logic contradicts that which forms the basis of these same states right to deny entry to their territories those fleeing climate persecution or even the basis of their justification to wage war against resource aggressors who infringe upon their territorial rights. If redefined as a zone of common possession, the Arctic Shelf will, in all likelihood, become a less well regulated commons and a less well regulated commons becomes a prescription for overuse, not one ensuring the 'protection and preservation of the Arctic in unison with its population' (European Commission, *Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps* 2012). What is being proposed effectively is a two-tier regime of climate justice where the world's more powerful states exert their rights to protect the resource base residing on their own territories through military means if necessary and simultaneously, their right to pursue other sources of scarce resources in territories sometimes occupied by other peoples (e.g. indigenous communities) also through military means if necessary.

In March 2009, the Russian Security Council published *The Fundamentals of Russian State Policy in the Arctic up to 2020 and Beyond* outlining Russia's intentions to augment military, border, and coastal guard presence in the region and 'guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances' that potentially threaten 'Russia's national interest' (Russian Security Council 2009:102). In January 2009, the US government released a *US Arctic Policy Report* (Presidential Directive-66 (NSPD) where it explains how 'the United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region'. Its desire is to 'preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the

³ The European Union, comprising of 27 member states (2013), has just three (and with Iceland potentially four) Arctic Council states amongst its members. The USA has lobbied for more open access to the resources of the Arctic, allowing multinational corporations to take fuller advantage of its resource reserves.

Arctic region' and facilitate a 'safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic region' (National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66) 2009: 2). Similar to the Russia position, 'the broad and fundamental national security interests' of the US are at the forefront of this policy statement, as is government's willingness 'to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests' (US Government 2009). In May 2013, the US government published *National Strategy for the Arctic* where again it reiterates the aim to 'prioritise and synchronise efforts to protect US national and homeland security interests' (ibidem: 5) and 'protect the American people, our sovereign territory and rights' (ibidem: 6).

In January 2011, The European Parliament passed a resolution entitled *A Sustainable EU Policy for the High North*, highlighting European interests and entitlements to the resources of the Arctic. This was followed in 2012 by a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on behalf of the Commission entitled *Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps* (2012) describing how 'the time is now ripe to refine the EU's policy stance towards the region' (p. 5), and drawing attention to the various ways in which 'the Arctic offers both challenges and opportunities [that] will significantly affect the life of European citizens in future generations' (2012: 8). Such assertions reflect a strongly communitarian interpretation of obligations of justice, one prioritising the citizenship rights and security interests of present and future Europeans, or as the case may be, Russian or US citizens. Much emphasis is placed on the marginal status of indigenous communities (of the 4,000,000 people living in the Arctic just 10% of this population, the Commission (2012) notes, are indigenous peoples) and no reference is made to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) protecting the rights of such peoples to 'their lands, territories and resources' or 'emphasising the contribution of the demilitarisation of the lands and territories of indigenous peoples to peace, economic and social progress and development' (see Annex: 2). Clearly lacking is a sufficient level of recognition of the historical rights of indigenous communities to the resources of the Arctic.

Repeatedly, the European Commission (2012) stresses its commitment to 'pro-

protecting the global environment' and finding 'solutions to societal challenges that transcend Europe' and have an effect on communities everywhere. But no attempt is made to articulate more precisely what the resource entitlements of the global citizen might look like. With escalating tensions over issues of ownership, sovereignty, fishing rights, rights of passage, exploratory rights, and so forth, it is hard to hear the voices of those whose traditional ways of life and ecosystems are in danger of being destroyed (e.g., indigenous Arctic communities, e.g. the Inuit of Greenland, the Aleuts of Southwest Alaska, the Athabascans of Eastern Alaska and the Sámi people of Scandinavia who maintain a close connection to the natural environment through subsistence on wildlife and natural resources). The Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East released a statement entitled *Discrimination Against Indigenous People of the North in the Russian Federation* demanding that the Government of the Russian Federation begin a negotiation process with the indigenous peoples of the north as represented by its social organisations and movements in order to resolve fundamental issues essential to the survival and development of indigenous peoples, including a recognition of the fact that the Russian Government currently 'lacks any kind of policy for the 29 endangered indigenous groups of the north that number 200,000 people, for whom the transition to a market economy is characterised by a total breakdown of traditional economic activities and way of life, an uncontrolled growth of unemployment and impoverishment' and 'expressing the will of the most socially unprotected and needy ethnic groups within Russia who have become outcasts on their own land' but who now seek a recognition of their human rights to 'freedom, housing, food' and political rights to representation and political voice (Statement by Social Organisations and Movements of Indigenous People of the North 2013: 2). This statement was signed by G.N. Psyagin, President of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Sakhalin Island; P. S. Stepanov, President of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the Republic of Buryatia; A. V. Krivoshapkin, President of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); E. A. Gaer, General Secretary of the International League of Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Groups; V. I. Gayulskii, President of the Fund for the Survival and Economic and Cultural Development of

Indigenous Peoples of the North Deputy State Duma; E. D. Aipin, President of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and Far East, amongst others. If marine biologists are correct, the Arctic region will be stripped of a large portion of its rich fisheries and minerals within a decade, leaving its indigenous communities with insufficient means to preserve traditional ways of life. Other organisations campaigning for the rights of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic and an alternative climate justice regime for wider humanity include Earthjustice, Greenpeace, as well as Friends of the Earth.

2.2. In the national interest

In the absence of a 'more determinate mode of cosmopolitan judgment' (Fine 2006: 63) and commitment to a truly democratic system of deliberation and representation on resource distribution and conflict resolution at present, self interest is presented as 'national interest', Russian interests, EU interests, US interests, and so forth, and further still, is seen as best served by states yielding what power resources available to them (including those of a political, military, or economic kind) to maintain the contradictory order of climate justice that currently prevails internationally. Assuming that it is correct that individual states strive to protect their own natural resource base and if necessary, wage war in self-defence to protect the needs of their own peoples, the question remains as to how the peoples of other climate vulnerable countries (e.g. Somalia, Ethiopia, or Kenya) subject to ever more intense cycles of drought, can best pursue their own communal interests (as expected) if the natural resource based upon which these peoples depend for their survival is jeopardised by harmful practices occurring largely beyond their own shores (in particular excessive greenhouse gas emissions on the part of more industrialised countries).

If the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Small Island States, or even the indigenous peoples of the Arctic region do not bear primary responsibility for the depletion of their food, energy, or mineral reserves, it is unreasonable for the wider community of states to (1) expect them to endure the escalating humanitarian costs of resource deficiency with little assistance from the rest of the international community; (2) assume in international climate change debate that we are dealing

with a level playing field in terms of the resource supplies available to each state to exploit and; (3) assert a right to military action and deny others in need access to land, water, oil, or in the case of those permanently displaced by climate change, a right to asylum. When consider the largely external nature of the threats posed to less industrialised, low-lying and semi-arid countries, it becomes less clear how these communities might best 'pursue a national agenda' and protect the resource needs of future generations of citizens.

What the law of peoples, as it is currently interpreted, does not acknowledge are the stark inequalities that prevail between different communities in terms of the international distribution of the burdens of global climate change. In light of this known fact, it is not reasonable for states or a group of states, e.g. the EU, to threaten to take action against other 'overstretched states' facing humanitarian disaster who may infringe upon their resource rights, when it can be proven that the EU, along with the US and other climate powers bear primary responsibility for global climate harms (e.g. carbon dioxide emissions), and in continuing to produce dangerously high levels of Green House Gas emissions, violate the rights of billions across the world to a safe, clean, and sustainable environment. According to John Rawls' (1999: 332) law of peoples, 'the aim of war is a just peace and therefore the means employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy'. Yet wars waged in the interests of protecting the resource needs of some at the expense of those of others and in time, all, cannot be said to be in the interests of a 'just peace'. Certain discourses, like that equating natural resource scarcity with greater conflict rather than with the possibility of resource redistribution (overriding a system of distributive justice based solely on property rights or the territorial rights of states), function to preserve a broad collective understanding of what is 'inevitable' (i.e. war) and a validation of the status of those charged with responding in what is seen as a befitting manner to such truths (e.g. moves on the part of Russia and the US to establish new military units in the Arctic). What are clearly not open to critical consideration in this instance are those imaginaries of justice currently motivating overly militarised responses to the 'geopolitical implications' of global climate change.

The 'spillover effects' of ecologically destructive practices on the part of intense polluters make other states justifiably interested parties and, in the process, a wider set of ecological but also ethical bonds are created amongst a broad affiliation of affected communities. Climate change burdens, especially resource deficiencies or the threat of resource plundering, can no longer be treated as 'internal matters of state' requiring a deployment of military units in defence of 'national interests'. Populations everywhere become members of 'overlapping communities of fate' (Held 2000: 399), as the interconnectedness of the world's peoples in this age of climate adversity becomes ever more apparent. This fact alone, however, is not sufficient to suddenly initiate a 'cosmopolitan re-mapping of global inequalities' (Beck 2011) or resource rivalry. Notions of 'our common future' (United Nations, *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future* 1987) and the 'need for effective international cooperation to manage ecological and economic interdependence' (ibidem: 7) have circulated in international political debate on climate change for more than three decades. Yet in the intervening years, this discourse has not provoked any really serious efforts to cosmopolitanise the law of peoples and extend spheres of justice across sovereign borders in a manner that ensures a minimum resource justice or even a 'sustainable future' for all the peoples of this world.

In December 2012, the decision was made to remove from the final text of the Doha climate conference in Qatar (December 2012) the longstanding principle of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – *Common and Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities* (CBDR). The notion of 'differentiated responsibilities' has always been an important reminder of persisting inequalities between the developing and developed worlds and of the need to acknowledge duties to assist climate vulnerable communities. The latter represents a moral minimum, a duty that governs our relations with others in a resource constrained world. As a central component of a minimal humanitarian response to climate change, the duty to assist has a long history with earlier renditions stretching back to the so-called 'Age of Discovery' when travellers shipwrecked at sea sought and received the assistance of others. In the years since, it has continued to be an integral component

of international relations. Efforts to minimise its importance in more recent climate change debates signal a political climate where differentiated responsibilities for resource destruction might be acknowledged at some level but not necessarily interpreted as sufficiently 'politically relevant' (Beck 2008) to necessitate immediate corrective action. Instead, national interests and security are once again prioritised over commitments to alleviate the suffering of distant others.

3. Toward a transnational peace on the distribution of global resources

A question arises of how can the peoples of climate vulnerable regions be expected to preserve the communal aspects of their existence and protect their natural resource base for future generations if little effort is made to assist such people or to find peaceful solutions to life-threatening scenarios of deprivation, starvation, or war. Efforts to establish a stable order of climate justice for the future need not be insensitive to the basic resource needs of all members of the global commons. Neither should the political, economic and legal relevance of states' traditional sovereign entitlements be denied but clearly what must be addressed is the 'uncomfortable paradox' (Beck 2008: 131) emerging at present between a regime that, in principle, supports cooperation, peace, and solidarity when confronting our common ecological fate, but on the other hand, offers legitimation to scenarios of war and intensifying competition between states for dwindling reserves of fresh water, oil, gas, minerals, and arable lands. As Rainer Forst (2007) argues, such contradictory reasoning and the unjust relations it gives rise to, have to be subject to greater international political debate. To maintain peaceful relations amongst the states and regions of this world, a deeper understanding of actors' motives, intentions, and capacities for democratic reasonableness (rather than military aggression) is required. 'The disadvantaged' must be given a greater opportunity to voice their concerns and defend their position as warranting special duties of responsibility on the part of the wider international community for both contemporary and historical harms inflicted (e.g. histories of colonisation and the confiscation of indigenous communities' lands and other resources). At a minimum, histories of exploitation need to become a more prominent

part of international debate on the changing dynamics of a globally relevant resource justice.

Democratic commitments to an international order of perpetual peace (see, for instance, *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter 1, Article 1, 1945) compel the international community to at least consider ways in which an escalation of resource conflicts can be forestalled in the future. The best way to go beyond victor's justice (there are, after all, no real winners in global climate destruction) and assure that the prevailing peace is just is to trans-nationalise procedures for peace building (Bohman 2012). Prospects for the latter could be explored across multiple deliberative procedures (legal, political, as well as public procedures) organised at the local, regional, and international level. Here the conduct of resource wars could be debated from multiple angles and perspectives. Gradually, on the basis of ongoing and multiple deliberation, a new set of requirements for a 'just global peace' under deteriorating ecological conditions could be established. Ideally, the peace perspective that would thereby emerge would remain open-minded and focused continuously on testing the inter-subjective validity of evolving notions of the good or the just (Held 2005) in response to changing environmental conditions. Also, if truly the product of multiple deliberative procedures, would not to be reducible to the position of any one state or a particular configuration of states, but rather would cut across local, regional, national, and global value perspectives. For practical political purposes, the normative order of such transnational peace-building procedures should to be aligned with the organisational structures of the UN (and in particular, the UN Security Council) but in a manner that guarantees for these procedures a degree of independence to ensure that current situations of domination, resource rivalry, and radical inequality are challenged on the basis of principles of trust, mutual understanding, and consensus-building. The hope is that new peace constituencies would pre-empt the emergence of major war scenarios in the future and lead to a more equitable and sustainable system of resource distribution in 'world risk society' (Beck, Levy, 2013). Such procedures may well provide the necessary impetus to stimulate a countervailing democratic movement towards greater resource sharing chiefly by embedding issues related to the global distribution of scarce natural resources within trans-nationally

sustained relations of peace and human rights solidarity. Understandings of morally relevant community in this instance would adjust accordingly, with 'communities of place' making way for a less territorially dominant understanding of overlapping communities of common ecological fate and civic belonging.

4. Conclusion

This paper questioned the justificatory basis of war as a proposed future response to growing inter-regional tensions and natural resource scarcity. Wars waged in the interests of protecting the resource needs of some sovereign communities at the expense of others and in time, possibly all of humanity, it argued, cannot be said to be in the interests of a 'just peace'. Because states are more likely than not to assert the supremacy of the national interest even in the face of the practical limitations of doing so (in terms of securing the long-term survival of a global humanity), a more inclusive cosmopolitan framework for global peace-building and resource redistribution is required. There are, however, a number of barriers currently preventing the substitution of an overly nationalist focused framework for resource distribution for a more cosmopolitan one. A lingering 'national gaze' is more the product of a persisting lack of reflexivity in the self-understandings and long-term perspective of state communities and an unwillingness to address radical inequalities of opportunity in the context of globally sustained climate risks.

A genuine peace in the face of such problems can no longer be pursued by states acting alone, especially given deepening asymmetries of international power relations and resource opportunities. The challenge for the international community is to find ways of broadening the moral and political horizons of states, publics, and societies more generally in a manner that acknowledges our global interconnectivity. According to Gerard Delanty (2013), such changes require major cognitive transformations in the way of thinking about the world and human place within it. Just as nations cultivate distinct imaginaries of belonging, similarly, 'the cosmopolitan imagination' (Delanty 2011) also has to be nurtured. New visions of democracy require a less bordered regime of resource entitlement and a series of transna-

tional procedures of deliberation capable of addressing global problems of resource deprivation and humanitarian crisis.

New transnational deliberative designs are needed to empower communities and account for the perspective of a broad range of peoples, not only that of major economic players and states preparing for war, but also those for whom climate change has meant a devastating loss of community, home, and livelihood. Greater exposure to the deeply human perspective of multiple climate witnesses situated at the cold front of climate destruction helps to ground the cosmopolitan imagination in a concrete subject of common interest. Ideally, new deliberative procedures would encourage the development of 'transnational peace constituencies' (Bohman 2012) where the regulative principles of multiple-levelled decision-making (at local, regional and international levels) would allow for a questioning of conventional interpretations of the limits of resource entitlements, as well as an exploration of alternative arrangements, more reflective of the basic resource needs of diverse populations. The aim would be the establishment of a new trans-national democratic settlement that guarantees a minimum resource justice for all members of the global collective and ensures a peaceful end to rivalry and hostilities between climate challenged communities.

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